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How did the  legal and political- administrative relation-
ship between central and local governments of two de-
centralised states shape their response to COVID- 19? 
Literature and theories on decentralisation argue that 
federal and decentralised states are less able to respond 
to crises in a coordinated manner due to their perceived 
greater susceptibility to political conflict. Situated within 
this theoretical debate and based on the analysis of legal 
acts, political decisions, and relevant national news media 
articles between March and August 2020 in Germany 
and Italy, this research note shows that, counterintui-
tively, more decentralisation does not necessarily trans-
late into more legal and political stress during pandemic 
management. In responding to the COVID- 19 pandemic, 
Germany, a highly decentralised state, experienced less 
legal and political tensions than the less decentralised 
Italy. The key to understanding this variation lies in dif-
ferent institutional arrangements, complemented by the 
specific political cultures of both states.
Zusammenfassung
Wie beeinflussten die rechtlichen und politisch- 
administrativen Beziehungen zwischen lokalen und zen-
tralen Regierung zweier dezentraler Staaten deren Umgang 
mit COVID- 19? In der Literatur über Dezentralisierung 
gelten föderale und dezentralisierte Staaten aufgrund ihrer 
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potentiell höheren Anfälligkeit für politische Konflikte 
als weniger in der Lage, koordiniert auf Krisen zu re-
agieren. Eingebettet in diese theoretische Debatte und ba-
sierend auf der Analyse von rechtlichen Verordnungen, 
politischen Entscheidungen und relevanten nationalen 
Nachrichtenartikeln zwischen März und August 2020 in 
Deutschland und Italien zeigt die vorliegende Research 
Note, dass mehr Dezentralisierung entgegen diesen 
Erwartungen nicht zwangsläufig zu mehr rechtlichem 
und politischem Stress während des Managements einer 
Pandemie führen muss. Als Reaktion auf die COVID- 19- 
Pandemie erlebte Deutschland, ein stark dezentralisierter 
Staat, weniger rechtliche und politische Spannungen als 
das weniger dezentralisierte Italien. Der Schlüssel zum 
Verständnis dieser Unterschiede sind die unterschiedli-
chen institutionellen Arrangements der jeweiligen Länder, 
ergänzt durch ihre spezifischen politischen Kulturen.
Résumé
Comment la relation juridique et politico- administrative 
entre les gouvernements centraux et locaux de deux États 
décentralisés a- t- elle modelé leur réponse au COVID- 19 ? 
La littérature et les théories sur la décentralisation souti-
ennent que les États fédéraux et décentralisés sont moins 
capables de répondre aux crises de manière coordonnée 
en raison de leur plus grande prédisposition aux conflits 
politiques. Cette note de recherche contribue à ce débat 
théorique par une analyse des actes juridiques, des déci-
sions politiques et des articles de la presse nationale entre 
mars et août 2020 en Allemagne et en Italie, qui montre 
que, contre toute attente, plus de décentralisation n’a pas 
nécessairement conduit à plus des tensions juridiques et 
politiques lors de la gestion de la pandémie. En réponse 
au COVID- 19, l'Allemagne, un État très décentralisé, 
a connu moins de tensions juridiques et politiques que 
l'Italie, moins décentralisée. La clé pour comprendre cette 
variation réside dans les différents arrangements institu-
tionnels, complémentés par les cultures politiques spéci-
fiques des deux États.
K E Y W O R D S
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INTRODUCTION
When the COVID- 19 crisis erupted, many states had to take unprecedented health measures 
to contain the spread of the virus. The pandemic defied domestic political and legal conven-
tions, especially in decentralised countries characterised by the distribution of political and 
legal power and competences between a central government and constituent units. Germany 
and Italy represent two particularly distinctive examples along the spectrum of decentrali-
sation. Germany is a federal state characterised by constituent units (Länder), while Italy is 
a decentralised state composed of regions (regioni). Situated within theoretical debates on 
decentralisation and based on a content and discourse analysis of national news media ar-
ticles between March and August 2020, this research note asks: how did the specific legal and 
political- administrative relationship between central and local governments of Germany and 
Italy shape their management of the COVID- 19 crisis? Federal and decentralised states are 
thought to be prone to ineffective responses due to the risk of high levels of political conflict 
and hence less able to coordinate their crisis response. Counterintuitively, our research note 
shows that Germany, a highly decentralised country, experienced significantly less legal and 
political stress during pandemic management than the less decentralised Italy. We argue that 
this is due to different institutional arrangements complemented by some features of intra- and 
inter- governmental political culture. First, we consider the relevant theoretical and empiri-
cal literature on decentralization and federalism before turning to a brief discussion of our 
methodology. Following on from this discussion, we then argue, with supporting empirical 
evidence, that the legal and political- administrative relationship between different levels of 
government in Germany and Italy impacted crisis management in both states. Finally, we 
consider the comparability of our empirical findings and their applicability for future work.
DECENTRALISATION AND EMERGENCY
Studies on decentralisation are numerous and have analysed different issue areas, such as 
health, education, economic and fiscal stability, development (Abimbola et al. 2019; Costa- 
i- Font and Greer 2013; Madon et al. 2010; Saltman and Bankauskaite 2006; Stegarescu 2005; 
Rondinelli 1983). Other studies have focussed on the effects of decentralisation on political and 
fiscal governance and accountability (Fauget 2014; Wibbels 2005; Oxhorn et al. 2004; Bardhan 
2002; Mello and Barenstein 2001).
Decentralisation refers to the reallocation of power from higher/central to lower/constituent 
levels and can be of different types: political, administrative, or fiscal (Benz 2011; Treisman 
2007). For the purposes of this research note, we consider political decentralisation to be the 
shift of policy- making responsibility from the central government to local/constituent units 
within a country (Pollitt 2005). This definition involves the delegation of both legislative and 
executive powers from the central government to the local/constituent units, which are ac-
countable to the electorate (Hermansson 2019). Thus, political decentralisation is reflected 
in a particular legal and political- administrative relationship between different levels of gov-
ernment. We define the legal relationship between government levels as the interaction among 
central and local authorities based on the allocation of legal authority and competencies to the 
centre and the constituent units as defined by the constitution and legal provisions (Costa- i- 
Font and Greer 2013). The laws governing decentralisation shape the political- administrative 
relationship between different levels of government, since power is constitutionally allocated 
in such a way that the different levels of government can legislate independently (Bolleyer and 
Thorlakson 2013). This relationship becomes politically relevant, since it constitutes the basis 
for the discursive attribution of, and claims to, management responsibilities and competen-
cies by political stakeholders at different levels of government. Competing claims or shifts of 
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responsibility by political stakeholders may impede swift and effective policy responses to a 
crisis due to a variety of mechanisms.
Decentralisation allows for the settling of political tensions, guaranteeing closer contact 
between government representatives and their citizens, which better reflects the plurality and 
regional differentiation of social interests (Benz 2011; Paquin 2011; Conyers 2000). However, 
decentralisation can also increase the risk of conflict among a plurality of actors all seeking to 
hold/share power, thereby potentially causing disputes between different levels of government 
over the management of resources (Shou and Haug 2005). Indeed, because of their institutional 
complexity, federal and decentralised states are generally considered to be less able to respond 
to crises in a rapid and coordinated manner (Hegele and Schnabel 2021). As a result of decen-
tralization, individual actors might have the incentive to engage in a ‘blame game’, wherein all 
actors attempt to avoid responsibility for potentially risky or unpopular decisions (Birkland 
and Waterman 2008; Schneider 2008). This is particularly relevant when an emergency or crisis 
occurs, exacerbating existing and complex dynamics deriving from decentralisation (Colan 
2006; Carter and May 2020; Migone 2020a; Migone 2020b). Finally, decentralised states can 
be prone to ineffective political responses to a crisis if they lack clear and effective political and 
legal guidelines for the coordination of different levels of government (Gerber and Robinson 
2009; Landy 2008; Menzel 2006). Hence, the specific existing legal and political- administrative 
relationship between different levels of government may impact the ability of a government to 
effectively handle exogenous shocks such as the COVID- 19 pandemic.
METHODOLOGY
To address our research question, we focus on Germany and Italy from March to August 2020. 
Among all members of the European Union, these two countries represent most different cases 
and diverge on several important characteristics. Germany is among the most populous democ-
racies in Western Europe. Over the last 15 years, it has been the most resilient European country 
in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, with a constant national surplus and stable government.1 
Contrastingly, Italy has struggled severely, with seven years of stagnation, a very high national 
public debt and government instability.2 Germany and Italy also occupy different positions on a 
continuum of decentralisation: Germany is a federal state and Italy is a decentralised one (Paquin 
2011). As a result, this research note compares the COVID- 19 pandemic responses of two coun-
tries that were affected by the same crisis but differ both in their degree of decentralisation and 
in their socio- economic characteristics. In doing so, we intend to show how the legal and political- 
administrative relationship of these two countries shaped their ability to manage the COVID- 19 
crisis. We assume that the specific configuration of the legal and political- administrative rela-
tionship acts as an intervening variable that impacts the management capability (dependent vari-
able) of a given state during a crisis (independent variable).
Our analysis is limited to the ‘first wave’ of the pandemic (March- August 2020) and is 
based on the analysis of legal acts, political decisions, and the relevant national newspaper 
 1See World Bank for unemployment https://data.world bank.org/indic ator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2020&locat ions=DE- IT- GB- 
ES- FR&start =2008&view=chart; https://datab ank.world bank.org/repor ts.aspx?sourc e=2&serie s=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&count 
ry=DEU,ITA,FRA,ESP,GBR; economic growth https://datab ank.world bank.org/repor ts.aspx?sourc e=2&serie s=NY.GDP.MKTP.
KD.ZG&count ry=DEU,ITA,FRA,ESP,GBR; poverty, https://data.world bank.org/indic ator/SI.POV.NAHC?end=2018&locat 
ions=DE- IT- FR- GB- ES&start =2008&view=chart;
see Eurostat for national debt: https://ec.europa.eu/euros tat/stati stics - expla ined/index.php?title =File:Gener al_gover nment_
debt,_2018_and_2019_(%C2%B9)_(Gener al_gover nment_conso lidat ed_gross_debt,_%25_of_GDP)_2020- 10- 22.png; social 
protection, https://ec.europa.eu/euros tat/web/socia l- prote ction/ data/database; health, https://ec.europa.eu/euros tat/web/healt h/
data
 2See European Central Bank data: https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/repor ts.do?node=10000 04191
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articles.3 First, we conducted a content analysis to understand whether and how the pandemic 
impacted the legal relationship between different levels of government, i.e. whether and how 
the COVID- 19 pandemic impacted the distribution of legal competencies between different 
levels of government. To understand whether and to what degree this was the case, we relied 
on relevant legal texts that described changes in the legal relationship between the central 
government and its constituent units. Second, we conducted a discourse analysis of govern-
ment discourses and political decisions reported in news media to understand how political 
stakeholders framed their relationship with each other and therefore how COVID- 19 impacted 
the political- administrative relationship between different levels of government. In particular, 
our analysis is based on statements made by politicians belonging to different levels of govern-
ment about the political responsibility for crisis management and about the relationship be-
tween the constituent units and the central government. Such statements, for instance, 
advocate for coordination, shift blame, or claim sole responsibility for adopting or easing 
measures.
GERMANY
The German Basic Law does not provide for the centralisation of authority in the case of an 
emergency. In contrast, emergency management is a competency of the Länder (Pohlmann 
2013: 252). Pandemic management as part of health policy is part of concurrent legislation 
under Article 74 para 1 no 19 of the German Basic Law. This means that the Länder have 
legislative power unless the federal government uses its concurrent powers. With the adoption 
of the first Infection Protection Law (IfSG) by the Bundestag in 2000, the federal government 
used these powers (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestags 2020a: 4). The im-
plementation of the IfSG through the adoption of measures such as lockdown and contact 
restrictions are the competency of the Länder (Kießling 2020).
The COVID- 19 pandemic did not impact the legal relationship between the federal government 
and the Länder insofar as the clear division of competencies for both healthcare and emergency 
management was maintained4 in line with the overall tradition of ‘executive federalism’. Executive 
federalism describes “a functional separation under which the federal government is assigned the 
bulk of legislative power while the states exercise most administrative powers” (Heidenheimer 
1966: 172 as cited in Rudzio 2019: 307). In line with this separation of legal competencies, the 
Länder adopted their own lockdown and contact restrictions to implement the IfSG. The federal 
level provided the legislative framework for pandemic management when, on 25 March 2020, the 
Bundestag declared the existence of a nationwide pandemic situation based on § 5 para 1 sentence 
1 IfSG, and subsequently applied the IfSG (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestags 
2020b: 4). This division of legal competencies between Bund and Länder was further maintained 
in both amendments to the IfSG that were adopted on 27 March 20205 and 19 May 2020,6 respec-
tively. Following the amendments, § 5 para 2 grants the federal Ministry of Health further execu-
tive powers but does so “without prejudice to the powers of the Länder”.
 3Germany: Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Spiegel Online, Zeit, Zeit Online, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung Online; Italy: Corriere della Sera, Il Giornale, Il Mattino, Il Messaggero, Il Sole 24 Ore, La Repubblica, La Stampa.
 4Note that this refers to our period of investigation (March – August 2020) only.
 5Erstes Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite, see Bundesgesetzblatt 14/2020, 
pp.587ff. https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/ bgbl/start.xav?start bk=Bunde sanze iger_BGBl&jumpT o=bgbl1 00s10 45.pdf#__
bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27I_2020_14_inhal tsver z%27%5D__16140 13775170.
 6Zweites Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite, see Bundesgesetzblatt 23/2020, 
pp.1018ff. https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/ bgbl/start.xav?start bk=Bunde sanze iger_BGBl&jumpT o=bgbl1 00s10 45.pdf#__
bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27I_2020_23_inhal tsver z%27%5D__16140 13984568
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The political- administrative relationship of Bund and Länder during COVID- 19 mirrored 
the German tradition of unitary federalism that is marked by a cooperative political culture 
and high levels of coordination (Braun 2003; Hüttmann 2010). During non- crisis times, coordi-
nation between the heads of Bund and Länder as well as their ministries, including the respec-
tive ministries of health, takes place through regular informal meetings (Gebauer 2006: 131). 
Although the agreements reached in these consultations are non- binding, Bund and Länder 
usually abide by them. Therefore, even issues that fall under the exclusive competence of the 
Länder are marked by high levels of standardisation and harmonisation (Rudzio 2019: 313f.).
Especially during the first months of the pandemic – from the first measures in March until 
the introduction of a regional threshold in May 2020 – both the federal government and the 
Länder relied heavily on cross- government coordination. On 12 March, Chancellor Merkel and 
the presidents of the Länder held their first joint consultation to discuss the appropriate steps 
for pandemic management and agreed that “the federal government and the Länder will closely 
cooperate in handling the pandemic” (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 
2020). While the Länder used their executive powers to adopt measures independently from 
each other, they did so within this non- binding framework of joint coordination. The devia-
tion of several Länder from the jointly agreed guidelines in easing lockdown restrictions were 
strongly condemned by federal and other Länder politicians in favour of slower steps (Schröder 
2020; dpa 2020). In May, the attribution of political- administrative responsibilities changed, 
when the Länder, together with Chancellor Merkel, agreed on a threshold of 50 new infec-
tions per 100,000 inhabitants as a key tool for pandemic management. Although the legal rela-
tionship between Bund and Länder remained unchanged by this decision, mainstream media 
framed the introduction of this mechanism as a symbolic “delegation of (political) responsi-
bility” from the federal to the state level (Mestermann and Schröder 2020). Although Merkel 
continued to call for coordination between the Länder, the latter stressed their individual re-
sponsibility and adopted greatly diverging strategies in the following weeks: while Thüringen 
and Brandenburg lifted all contact restrictions two weeks before the agreed end- date, Bavaria 
introduced additional tests for tourists returning from their holidays (Groll 2020; Günther 
2020; Endres 2020). The prospect of elections in several Länder, the federal election in 2021, and 
upcoming internal elections in the CDU/CSU intensified these differences, as the presidents 
of several Länder used debates about pandemic management strategies to build their distinct 
names and gain consensus among their constituencies. This may explain the political compe-
tition on easing lockdown restrictions between Markus Söder (Bavaria) and Achim Laschet 
(Nordrhein- Westfalen), which media commentators linked to both politicians’ aspirations to 
be nominated as candidate for the chancellorship by the CDU/CSU (Schnell 2020; Rohr 2020).
By emphasising unity and strategic coordination, the governments of the Länder and the 
federal government attributed the political responsibility for pandemic management to both 
levels of government as well as to the collective of all Länder. Thereby, they emphasised their 
joint responsibility, and the governments of the Länder could divert the political risks of pan-
demic management to other stakeholders. This logic became visible from May 2020 onwards, 
when the Länder began adopting diverging strategies: Länder that experienced higher overall 
numbers and a quicker rise of new cases in August feared that an earlier end of lockdown re-
strictions by other Länder would relativise the severity of the situation and endanger their own 
positive developments. Hence, they called for a renewed stronger role of federal coordination 
(Glas 2020; Maxwill 2020; Ludwig 2020). Länder with lower numbers of cases, on the con-
trary, employed the key rationale of federalism – the ability to account for regional differences 
– in order to justify their quicker pace in easing restrictions (Höhne 2020). This suggests that 
the Länder used coordination between Bund and Länder as a ‘backstop’ to increased uncer-
tainty and to collateralise the political risks of decision- making in highly volatile situations: 
the Länder endorsed coordination especially when policy making was risky and decisions were 
potentially unpopular, e.g. at the beginning and at the end of the first wave of the pandemic. In 
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both situations, the merits of different pandemic management strategies were still unclear. By 
building on traditions of unitary federalism and by aligning their measures with joint guide-
lines, the Länder enjoyed the ability to divert the responsibility to other stakeholders in case of 
failure. At the same time, similar actions in other Länder validated individual strategies. The 
political- administrative relationship between Bund and Länder as well as among the Länder 
can hence be described as a ‘pre- emptive blame game’ in which political stakeholders stressed 
joint responsibility in order to maintain the possibility of horizontally shifting responsibility 
(and, if necessary, blame) to the collective of the Länder.
ITALY
According to art. 117 of the Italian Constitution, healthcare is a shared competence between 
the state and the regions. However, in case of “severe danger to public safety and security” 
Art. 120 allows the government to supersede regions in addressing public concerns. In addi-
tion to Art. 120, other measures such as law n° 833, adopted in 1978, grant the President of 
the Council and the Minister of Health the right to intervene in the case of a pandemic. 
Furthermore, regional authorities can also take provisions in their territory when they deem 
it necessary.7
COVID- 19 had an impact on both the legal and political- administrative relationships be-
tween the state and the regions. The content and discourse analyses conducted of the legal acts, 
political decisions, and the relevant national newspaper during the first wave of the pandemic 
(March 2020 to August 2020) demonstrate that the pandemic further exacerbated existing 
legal and political conflicts between the state and the regions.
Concerning the legal relationship, the principle of loyal cooperation established by the 
Constitutional Court8 is a tenet that should govern relations between state and regions in those 
fields where their competencies concur and intersect (Bin and Pitruzzella 2011: 220). However, 
legal provisions for healthcare were insufficiently clear to guarantee an effective long- term re-
sponse. When the pandemic hit Italy, both state and regions struggled to share healthcare com-
petencies. This resulted in an asymmetry in the measures adopted at the national level and 
several legal conflicts over respective healthcare competencies (Clementi 2020). In particular, 
the state appeared weaker than might have been expected, allowing the presidents of the regions 
to adopt legal measures that overlapped and contradicted policies put forward by the state. 
During the first phase (March to April 2020), the Agency for Civil Protection, which is respon-
sible for risk prevention and intervention following an emergency, together with the Ministry of 
Interior released a legal order to harmonise and overcome the many different provisions taken 
by regional administrations during the first weeks of the pandemic. Indeed, the regions had al-
ready taken more restrictive measures than those of the government (Mirabelli 2020).
The legal contrasts between these two different levels of government characterised Italy’s 
response between March and April 2020. They subsided only when the central government 
released a decree renouncing its coordination and harmonisation role, thus, allowing each 
region to introduce expansionary and restrictive measures autonomously. The central govern-
ment would however maintain a supervisory function: if infections were to rise, it would retain 
the ability to intervene at the regional level (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2020a).
In addition, the content and discourse analyses undertaken highlight how COVID- 19 spe-
cifically impacted the political- administrative relationship between state and regions. These 
sources also demonstrate how the crisis led to a political and vertical ‘blame game’ between 
 7Law 23 December 1978 n. 833 (comma 6b).
 8Judgement 242/1997.
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the two different government levels: neither the president of the Council, Giuseppe Conte, nor 
the presidents of the regioni were willing to take unpopular political decisions. One relevant 
example of the ‘blame game’ evident in Italy’s response to the Covid- 19 pandemic is the case 
of Lombardy. At the beginning of the pandemic, the president of Lombardy, Attilio Fontana, 
waited for the Council President’s lockdown decree of 7- 8 March rather than taking swift mea-
sures. Fontana had an ambiguous approach: on the one hand, he was aware of the urgency of 
closing the Bergamo area and had previously urged for more autonomy from the state to shut 
down earlier (Gabbanelli and Ravizza 2020); on the other hand, as a judicial investigation has 
shown (Franco, 2020; Il Sole 24 Ore, 2020b), Lombardy’s local authorities, including Fontana, 
were put under pressure by industrial lobbies to avoid closures. Lombardy is in fact one of the 
most industrialised areas of Europe and industrial lobbies have a significant influence on local 
politics. Therefore, Fontana did not take action, later blaming the central government action for 
not being prompt and effective. As the Council president said, Fontana could have pre- empted 
the government’s action by taking measures to contain viral spread, just as the regioni of  Veneto, 
Lazio and Campania had done by circumscribing ‘red zones’. On the contrary, Fontana contin-
ued to argue that it was the government’s responsibility to take the restrictive measures (Ainis, 
2020; Greco, 2020). Thus, the COVID- 19 crisis highlights an important issue: in the face of 
a relatively unpopular decision, all actors (including the central government and the regioni’s 
authorities) refuse to take political responsibility for potentially costly health measures. Indeed, 
Fontana refused to take restrictive measures to avoid losing political consensus and support of 
his electorate, including local industries (Trocino, 2020). As such, there is some evidence to sup-
port the notion that blame shifting dominated politicians’ and parties’ considerations in the face 
of potentially unfavourable returns at the ballot box.
The impact of COVID- 19 on the political- administrative relationship between governance 
levels becomes evident in the changing role of the presidents of the regions. Since the beginning 
of the pandemic, they became much more relevant figures at the centre of political decisions 
and of media attention, shadowing their respective parties. This marked a further trend towards 
“personalisation” and, consequently, of “presidentialization” (Calise, 2020; Diamanti, 2020) of 
the Council president, Conte, as well as the regioni presidents, and particularly those of Veneto, 
Lombardy, Emilia- Romagna, and Campania. The media emphasised that they played a central 
role in managing the pandemic. Furthermore, their popularity increased among regional elec-
torate. In April of 2020, 42% of Italians stated that they thought that the regions had performed 
better in managing the Covid- 19 pandemic than the central government, while 34% said the 
opposite (Pagnoncelli, 2020a, 2020b). This resulted also in an increased popularity of the parties 
they represented, which opposed the Five Star Movement and, hence, central government led by 
Conte. The link between the regions’ presidents and their parties came across in many instances. 
For instance, Zaia and Fontana, who belonged to the League, were openly supported by Salvini 
who often made statements strengthening or anticipating the positions taken by the two regions’ 
presidents (La Stampa, 2020). Finally, the increased popularity among the electorate strength-
ened the claim of Veneto, Emilia- Romagna and Lombardy for “differentiated autonomy”, i.e. 
greater autonomy from the state, a request that the regions had already put forth in 2018.
CONCLUSION
Our research note has sought to understand how the specific legal and political- administrative re-
lationship between central and local governments of Germany and Italy shaped the management 
of the COVID- 19 crisis in both countries. Based on the analysis of legal acts, political decisions, 
and relevant national news media articles, we show that, in both countries, the pandemic fur-
ther accentuated already existing dynamics in the legal and political- administrative relation-
ship between central government and constituent units. In Germany, COVID- 19 left the legal 
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and political- administrative relationship between Bund and Länder unscathed, thanks to an 
established legal division of competencies for both healthcare and emergency management in 
line with the tradition of ‘executive federalism’. In addition, despite the pandemic, the political- 
administrative relationship in Germany followed a pattern of unitary federalism, which is 
marked by high levels of cooperative political culture and coordination. In contrast, COVID- 19 
further exacerbated Italy’s existing legal and political conflicts between central state and re-
gioni. The legal provisions for governing healthcare were not clear enough to guarantee an ef-
fective long- term response, and state and regions struggled in sharing healthcare competencies. 
This led not only to asymmetrical measures adopted across the country, but also impacted the 
political- administrative relationship between government levels. The crisis produced a vertical 
political ‘blame game’, by which neither the president of the Council nor the presidents of the 
regions were willing to take unpopular decisions and bear responsibility for a possible failure of 
the measures. The crisis also strengthened the role of the regional presidents who, for the first 
time, became key figures, attracting media attention and gaining increasing popularity and 
notability among the electorate. Conversely, in Germany, the shifting of responsibility for the 
introduction of health measures took place predominantly horizontally: by coordinating meas-
ures with joint guidelines during times of high uncertainty and political risk, the presidents of 
the Länder maintained the possibility of shifting blame to other stakeholders (such as the collec-
tive of all Länder) in case of failure, thereby embarking on a ‘pre- emptive blame game’.
From a theoretical perspective, federal and decentralised states are expected to be less able 
to respond to a crisis in a coordinated way. However, this comparison between Germany and 
Italy shows that Germany, a highly decentralised country, experienced much less legal and 
political stress during its pandemic management than the less decentralised Italy. Our analysis 
indicates that is largely due to a long history of coordination and cooperation among constit-
uent units and a definite legal division of competencies among the German Länder and the 
federal government. In contrast, in Italy, the pandemic deepened and further exacerbated the 
contrasts between state and regions because of an already existing indeterminacy of compe-
tencies and overlaps of legal measures, which paved the way for a political ‘blame game’, creat-
ing confusion and ineffectiveness. This suggests that the degree of decentralisation that shapes 
a country’s ability to respond to a crisis, such as a pandemic, is less crucial than the specific 
configuration of the legal and political- administrative relationship between the central gov-
ernment and the constituent units.
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